Содержание
- 2. Overview Discussion of the “Same Origin Policy” Overview of the “Sleeping Giant” The Introduction of 2
- 3. The Browser “Same Origin” Policy bank.com blog.net XHR XHR document, cookies TAG TAG JS
- 4. Cross-Site Request Forgery bank.com attacker’s post at blog.net Go to Transfer Assets https://bank.com/fn?param=1 Select FROM Fund
- 5. How Does CSRF Work? Tags Autoposting Forms XmlHttpRequest Subject to same origin policy
- 6. Credentials Included bank.com blog.net https://bank.com/fn?param=1 JSESSIONID=AC934234…
- 7. New Tool: OWASP CSRFTester Test your applications for CSRF Record and replay transactions Tune the recorded
- 8. DEMO: OWASP CSRFTester
- 9. What Can Attackers Do with CSRF? Anything an authenticated user can do Click links Fill out
- 10. Using CSRF to Attack Internal Pages attacker.com internal.mybank.com Allowed! CSRF Internal Site TAG internal browser
- 11. Misconceptions – Defenses That Don’t Work Only accept POST Stops simple link-based attacks (IMG, frames, etc.)
- 12. New Tool: OWASP CSRFGuard 2.0 User (Browser) 1. Add token with regex 2. Add token with
- 13. DEMO: OWASP CSRFGuard 2.0
- 14. Similar Implementations PHP CSRFGuard PHP Implementation of CSRFGuard http://www.owasp.org/index.php/PHP_CSRF_Guard JSCK PHP & JavaScript implementation http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2007/10/19/jsck/
- 15. DEMO: Cross-Site Scripting vs. CSRFGuard
- 16. Enterprise CSRF Mitigation Strategy Balance Between Security, Usability, and Cost MISSION CRITICAL FUNCTIONS EVERYDAY BUSINESS FUNCTIONS
- 17. http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery http://www.cgisecurity.com/articles/csrf-faq.shtml http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=107651&WT.svl=news1_2
- 18. Extra: How Widespread Are CSRF Holes? Very likely in most web applications Including both intranet and
- 19. Extra: Real World CSRF Examples
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