Risk Management презентация

Содержание

Слайд 2

Class #13 – CCP Risk Management

1

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

2

Central Counterparty Risk Management Framework

3

Calculating

CCP Risk

Annex

4

Class #13 – CCP Risk Management 1 Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties 2 Central

Слайд 3

Class #13 – CCP Risk Management

1

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

2

Central Counterparty Risk Management Framework

3

Calculating

CCP Risk

Annex

4

Class #13 – CCP Risk Management 1 Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties 2 Central

Слайд 4

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

“We allow the City to sleep at night.”

“Post-trade clearing

and settlement are sometimes referred to as the plumbing of the financial system. This term may suggest that clearing and settlement systems are of secondary importance. In fact, however, they are more like the central nervous system of the financial system.”

Chris Tupker, LCH.Clearnet

Michael Moskow, Chicago Federal Reserve

“I’m Winston Wolfe. I solve problems.”

The Wolf, Pulp Fiction

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties “We allow the City to sleep at night.” “Post-trade

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Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

Increasing Interest in Central Counterparties After the 2007/2008 Crisis

Successfully Managed

to Cope With an Extremely Challenging Environment

Helped to Mitigate the Consequences of Major Defaults

Broad Scope of Financial Institutions Affected - Banks, Asset Managers, Insurance Companies

Emblematic Case: Lehman Brothers

Clearinghouses Faced a Very Difficult Time, But No Relevant Default Occurred in This Sector

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties Increasing Interest in Central Counterparties After the 2007/2008 Crisis

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Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

Clearing, Settlement and Central Counterparty Services

Clearing and Central Counterparty Services

Credit

Risk Substitution

Default Management

Clearing Transactions

Exchanges, OTC Markets

CSDs, Banks

Trading

Post-Trading

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties Clearing, Settlement and Central Counterparty Services Clearing and Central

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Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

Credit Risk Substitution

Central Counterparty (CCP)

Original Buyer

Original Seller

Original Buyer

Original Seller

Credit Risk:

Seller

Credit Risk: Buyer

Credit Risk: CCP

Credit Risk: CCP

Substitution

The Central Counterparty Becomes the Buyer to Every Seller and the Seller to Every Buyer

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties Credit Risk Substitution Central Counterparty (CCP) Original Buyer Original

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Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

Default Management

Central Counterparty (CCP)

Original Buyer

Original Seller

Credit Risk: CCP

Credit Risk: CCP

Default

Management Procedures

New Buyer

Credit Risk: CCP

Stressed Markets

Uncertainty

Time Constraints

Kitchen Restaurant

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties Default Management Central Counterparty (CCP) Original Buyer Original Seller

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Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

Default Management

Default Management Procedures

Important Risk

Financial Losses Due to Adverse Market

Conditions

Example

Original Seller Sold 1M USD at 55,00 RUB/USD

Original Buyer Defaults – Does Not Deliver 55M RUB

Now Market is 50,00 RUB/USD

That Mean That a New Buyer Would Pay Only 50M RUB for 1M USD

Still, The Original Seller is Entitled to Receive 55M RUB in Exchange for 1M USD

Who’s Going to Pay for the Extra 5M RUB?

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties Default Management Default Management Procedures Important Risk Financial Losses

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Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

Loss Sharing Mechanisms in Central Counterparties

Survivors Pay Model

Defaulter Pays Model

Third

Party Pays Model

In the case of a default, losses must be absorbed by the defaulting participant alone. This typically entails having cash and securities posted as collateral prior to the default event (i.e. margin requirements).

In the case of a default, losses must be absorbed by the “surviving” participants (i.e. non-defaulters). This typically entails creating a pool of mutualized resources (i.e. clearing fund) that can be accessed in the event of a default.

In the case of a default, losses must be absorbed by a third party (i.e. non-participant). This typically entails having a guarantor (e.g. the CCP itself, insurance company) that puts its own capital at risk in exchange for a – implicit or explicit – premium.

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties Loss Sharing Mechanisms in Central Counterparties Survivors Pay Model

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Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

Hybrid (Multi-Layered) Mechanisms Tend to be More Efficient and are

the Industry’s Norm

Margin Requirements

Clearing Fund

CCP Capital

TP

SP

DP

Activation

The Size of Each Layer Usually Corresponds to a Given Confidence Level

Risk Waterfall

Level of
Confidence

Activation

Margin Requirements

Clearing Fund

CCP Capital

100.00%

99.99%

99.95%

99.50%

0.00%

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties Hybrid (Multi-Layered) Mechanisms Tend to be More Efficient and

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Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

Systemic Risk – Avoiding Contagion, Gridlocks and Complexity

CCP


No CCP With

CCP

= Default

Default Management
Process

Default Management
Process (?)

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties Systemic Risk – Avoiding Contagion, Gridlocks and Complexity CCP

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Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

Homogeneous Credit Risk – Main Benefits for the Trading Activity

Equal

Opportunities for Different Types of Participants

Absence of Credit Spreads

Superior Price Formation

Dynamic Electronic Trading Environment

Anonymous Trading

The Way They Are

The Way They Perceive Themselves

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties Homogeneous Credit Risk – Main Benefits for the Trading

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Class #13 – CCP Risk Management

1

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

2

Central Counterparty Risk Management Framework

3

Calculating

CCP Risk

Annex

4

Class #13 – CCP Risk Management 1 Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties 2 Central

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CCP Risk Management Framework

Central Counterparty Risk Management Framework

Encompasses All Risk Dimensions Present in

Day-to-Day Activities of a Clearinghouse

Legal Risk

Operational Risk

Credit Risk

Market Risk

Liquidity Risk

Resiliency

Deterrence

Continuity

Minimizes the probability of adverse events.

Adverse events have limited, well known, consequences.

Smooth operation, even under adverse conditions.

CCP Risk Management Framework Central Counterparty Risk Management Framework Encompasses All Risk Dimensions

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CCP Risk Management Framework

Legal Risk

Main Dangers

Sound Legal Framework

Basic Toolkit

Netting

Certainty and Finality

Collateral Protection

Adherence to

Clearinghouse Rules and Procedures

Clarity re Responsibilities and/or Potential Liabilities

Well Structured Contracts

Disputes Concerning Services and Procedures

Settlement Unwind

Litigation re Default Procedures

Collateral Seizure

CCP Risk Management Framework Legal Risk Main Dangers Sound Legal Framework Basic Toolkit

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CCP Risk Management Framework

Operational Risk

Main Dangers

High Availability IT Architecture

Basic Toolkit

IT Disruptions

Human Error, Fraud

Unavailability

of Service Providers

Natural Catastrophes

Internal Audits

Adequate Staffing

Business Continuity Plans

CCP Risk Management Framework Operational Risk Main Dangers High Availability IT Architecture Basic

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CCP Risk Management Framework

Credit Risk

Main Dangers

Well Structured Default Procedures

Basic Toolkit

Default of a Participant

Default

of a Financial Services Provider

Declining Credit Quality/Default of an Issuer of Collateral

Declining Credit Quality/Default of an Issuer of Investment Assets (Investment Portfolio)

Continuous, Thorough Credit Assessment

Participants

Financial Services Providers

Issuers – Collateral and Investments

Admission Criteria

Conservative Investment Policy

CCP Risk Management Framework Credit Risk Main Dangers Well Structured Default Procedures Basic

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CCP Risk Management Framework

Market Risk

Main Dangers

Robust Safeguard Structure

Basic Toolkit

Closeout Process Given a Participant

Default

Declining Collateral Values due to Adverse Market Movements

Declining Investment Values due to Adverse Market Movements (Investment Portfolio)

Margin Requirements

Clearing Funds

CCP Capital

Collateral Eligibility Criteria, MtM and Haircutting

Conservative Investment Policy, MtM

Comprehensive, Continuous Risk Monitoring Process

CCP Risk Management Framework Market Risk Main Dangers Robust Safeguard Structure Basic Toolkit

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CCP Risk Management Framework

Main Dangers

Liquidity Facilities

Basic Toolkit

Closeout Process Given a Participant Default

Liquidity Constraints

in the Investment Portfolio

Concentration Limits and/or Add-Ons

Participant Positions

Collateral

Investments

Comprehensive, Continuous Risk Monitoring Process

Liquidity Risk

CCP Risk Management Framework Main Dangers Liquidity Facilities Basic Toolkit Closeout Process Given

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Class #13 – CCP Risk Management

1

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

2

Central Counterparty Risk Management Framework

3

Calculating

CCP Risk

Annex

4

Class #13 – CCP Risk Management 1 Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties 2 Central

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Calculating CCP Risk

The Risk Management Problem of a Central Counterparty

Buyer to Every Seller,

Seller to Every Buyer

In The Absence of a Default, The CCP is Not Exposed to Market Risk

Zero Net Position

In The Case of a Default

Closeout Procedures

Adverse Market Environment

Financial Losses

Calculating CCP Risk The Risk Management Problem of a Central Counterparty Buyer to

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Calculating CCP Risk

The Risk Management Problem of a Central Counterparty

Risk Management in Banks

and Investment Funds

Full Control the Portfolio Composition/Risk Profile

No Pressing Need to Close Out Positions

Virtually no Limitations Concerning Hedging Procedures

Mark-to-Market Risk (i.e. Losses in Portfolio Value)

Risk Management in Central Counterparties

Very Limited Control the Portfolio Composition/Risk Profile

Positions Have to be Closed Out in a Short Period

Hedging Procedures can be Limited

Closeout Risk (i.e. Losses Inherent to the Closeout Process)

Calculating CCP Risk The Risk Management Problem of a Central Counterparty Risk Management

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Calculating CCP Risk

The Risk Management Problem of a Central Counterparty

When Modeling the Risk

Management Problem Faced by a Clearinghouse, one Must Consider, in a Joint Fashion, the Evolution of Market Variables (Prices and Rates) and the Portfolio Composition, Respecting a set of Important Restrictions Imposed by the Characteristics of Each Asset Under Consideration

t+0

t+1

t+2

t+3

t+4

t+N

...

Closeout Risk Calculation

Open Position (Original Portfolio)

P&L Calculation
Dynamic Process With Frictions

t+0

t+M

Ordinary, VaR-Like Models, Tend to Focus on the Potential Changes in Value (MtM) of a Static Portfolio, and This can be Regarded as Fairly Good Approximation to Closeout Risk in the Case of Highly Homogeneous Portfolios. In the Case of Highly Heterogeneous Portfolios (Multi Asset-Class and Multi Market), However, This is far from Acceptable.

MtM Risk Calculation
(VaR-Like Models)

P&L Calculation
Static Process Without Frictions

Implied Closeout Scenario: All Positions are to be Settled at the Same Time Without any Frictions and With Fully Coinciding Cash Flows

Calculating CCP Risk The Risk Management Problem of a Central Counterparty When Modeling

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Class #13 – CCP Risk Management

1

Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties

2

Central Counterparty Risk Management Framework

3

Calculating

CCP Risk

Annex

4

Class #13 – CCP Risk Management 1 Clearinghouses and Central Counterparties 2 Central

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Annex

Useful References

Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, CPMI-IOSCO, (2012);
Modelling Risk in Central Counterparty Clearing

Houses – A Review, Bank of England, (2002);
The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice, Pirrong, C., ISDA, (2011).

Annex Useful References Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, CPMI-IOSCO, (2012); Modelling Risk in

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